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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN MERGERS
AND THE PROFITS OF DECEIT
E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Managerial motivation to pursue mergers and acquisitions may
vary widely-from empire building to diversification of risk. One
such motivation is to allow shareholders of an undervalued corpora-
tion to realize the true value of their stock. Stock may be undervalued
because of asymmetric information; managers may have inside infor-
mation of which neither the market nor the shareholders are aware.
A slack'-poor corporation may have investment opportunities in un-
financed positive net present value projects that it cannot finance
without issuing new equity and thereby depressing the market value
of the stock-to the detriment of the existing shareholders. 2 A slack-
rich corporation may have no such internal investment opportunities.
A merger or acquisition of one of these corporations by the other
would benefit both shareholder groups.
Managers with knowledge of corporate opportunities who do not
maximize the value of the corporation by investing in all positive net
present value projects may find themselves takeover targets. New
management presumably will invest in the previously foregone oppor-
tunities, thereby increasing the value of the subsidiary or combined
entity.
Without disclosure of the inside information or the ability to sig-
nal a potential suitor, the merger will not take place. This Article ex-
amines mergers and tender offers in the context of asymmetric
* E.C. Lashbrooke, Jr. is the acting Associate Dean of the Eli Broad Graduate
School of Management, Michigan State University. Dean Lashbrooke received B.A.,
M.A., J.D., and LL.M. degrees from the University of Texas at Austin and a Ph.D. degree
from Michigan State University.
1. Slack is the amount of cash and equity securities on hand.
2. Empirical studies show that stock prices are depressed when a corporation an-
nounces an equity issue. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., Equity Issues and
Offering Dilution, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 61 (1986); Richard Kolodny & Diane Rizzuto Suhler,
Changes in Capital Structure, New Equity Issues, and Scale Effects, 8 J. FIN. REs. 127
(1985); Ronald W. Masulis & Ashok N. Korwar, Seasoned Equity Offerings: An Empirical
Investigation, 15 J. FIN. EcoN. 91 (1986); Wayne H. Mikkelson & M. Megan Partch, Valua-
tion Effects of Security Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 31 (1986).
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information and the restrictions that securities laws place on the flow
of information and its accuracy.
First, the existing finance literature on mergers is examined.
Next, a merger or tender offer between a slack-rich and a slack-poor
corporation with unfinanced positive net present value projects is ana-
lyzed in the context of federal and state securities laws. Strategies of
disclosure and deceit are examined together with their attendant ben-
efits and costs. The Article concludes that the managerial decision to
disclose, remain silent, or deceive depends on the managers' subjec-
tive evaluation of the risk of being caught.
II. BACKGROUND
Finance merger literature can be divided into two groups, the
older empirical studies on conglomerate mergers and the more mod-
em studies. Gershon Mandelker found that over most of the period
prior to merger, the target firms in his sample earned significantly
lower rates of return on equity than other firms.3 Mandelker further
discovered a significant and steady increase in cumulative residuals for
the target corporation over the seven-month period preceding the
merger.4 Other studies confirm that there is a positive relationship
between merger activity and strong economic growth-that is, periods
of economic and market advances.5 Mergers do not seem to have
generated increases in the value of the acquiring corporation, 6 but this
phenomenon may be explained by Richard Roll's hubris hypothesis.7
Roll's hypothesis is that managers are overly optimistic in evaluating
target corporations as takeover candidates and thus pay more for the
target corporation than they should.8 This phenomenon may be a
function of asymmetric information.
This asymmetric information problem is quite different than that
posed in other finance literature dealing with mergers and tender of-
3, Gershon Mandelker, Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Finns, 1 J. FIN. ECON.
303, 314, 319-20 (1974).
4. Id. at 314.
5. RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 1895-1956
(1959); SAMUEL R. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS AND THE ECONOMY (1968).
6. Dennis C. Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers, 1 J. BANKING & FIN. 315,
332-33 (1977).
7. Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. Bus. 197
(1986).
8. Id. at 212.
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fers. In the literature it is usually the bidder who has the information
advantage rather than the target managementf
Ronald Giammarino and Robert Heinkel modelled takeover be-
havior in 1986.10 They model an informed bidder and an uninformed
bidder in addition to the target corporation-all of which are risk neu-
tral." The informed bidder has an information advantage over both
the uninformed bidder and the target corporation.' 2 The model is
highly structured and the uninformed, bidder is given a tactical advan-
tage in the way in which the bidding is organized.' 3 Under the
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, all actions are optimal and each bidder
and the target manager correctly anticipate the strategies of the other
participants.' 4 The model generates two distinctive equilibria result-
ing from different assumptions about the uninformed bidder's behav-
ior. The first assumption is that the uninformed bidder will not
present a counteroffer when expected payoffs from bidding and not
bidding are equal. 5 This is the passive competition case. In this case
the informed bidder may acquire the target corporation for less than
its synergistic value. 6 In the second case, the "white knight" scenario,
the uninformed bidder is assumed always to counterbid. A counterbid
gives the target corporation a higher price at the expense of the in-
formed bidder.'7
The Giammarino and Heinkel model gives the target corpora-
tion's management a rational basis for rejecting the informed bidder's
offer in the hope of getting a higher counterbid from the uninformed
bidder.18 The model also accounts for overbidding by the uninformed
bidder and loss of the offer if the informed bidder's offer is rejected
and a counterbid is not forthcoming.' 9 Both result from asymmetric
information.
9. See, e.g., infra note 10.
10. Ronald M. Giammarino & Robert L. Heinkel, A Model of Dynamic Takeover Be-
havior, 41 J. FmN. 465 (1986).
11. Id. at 467.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 470.
15. Id. at 472.
16. Id. at 473.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 471.
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David Hirshleifer and Ivan Png formulated a model with two bid-
ders competing for the target corporation.20 In contrast to earlier
models that assume that bidding is costless, 21 this model assumes that
bidding is costly. The objective of the target management is to maxi-
mize the value of the shareholders' stock; this implies that target man-
agers will accept the bid if it exceeds the value of the target
corporation's cash flows without the merger. The first bidder inves-
tigates and formulates a value for the target corporation. The second
bidder is alerted by the first bidder's offer. The second bidder must
then decide whether to investigate, and based on any investigation,
whether or not to bid.2 The second bidder investigates only if its ex-
pected return from investigation is strictly positive. Bidding is struc-
tured in two different ways. The first model is a single-bid model;
each bidder may bid only once. 5 Alternatively, the second model al-
lows a competing bid to be revised.26
Contrary to assumptions that competitive bidding for a target
corporation always resulted in higher prices than a single bid,27 Hirsh-
leifer and Png demonstrated that if bidding is costly, competitive bid-
ding may result in a lower price than that obtainable from a single
deterring bid. 8 Under the Hirshleifer and Png model, the Delaware
Supreme Court's requirement for an auction in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.29 may actually be detrimental to
the target corporation's shareholders.
The target corporation's management may affect the outcome by
the degree to which it is willing to disclose information to either or
both bidders and thereby reduce investigation costs. 30 This has the
20. David Hirshleifer & Ivan P.L. Png, Facilitation of Competing Bids and the Price of a
Takeover Target, 2 REv. FiN. STuD. 587 (1989).
21. See, e.g., Michael J. Fishman, A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding, 19 RAND
J. ECON. 88 (1988); Andrei Sheifer & Robert W. Vishny, Greenmai4 White Knights, and
Shareholder's Interests, 17 RAND J. ECON. 293 (1986).




26. Id at 595.
27. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. Rv. 1161 (1981); Ronald J.
Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in
Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. Rnv. 819 (1981); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Comment, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1028 (1982).
28. Hirshleifer & Png, supra note 20, at 600.
29. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
30. Hirshleifer & Png, supra note 20, at 600.
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unfortunate effect of lowering the expected price for the target corpo-
ration and decreasing social welfare.31
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny examined the role of a large
shareholder in corporate control.3 2 If the shareholders are atomistic,
it may not benefit any one of them to monitor the performance of the
target corporation's management. However, it may be beneficial for a
large shareholder to assume a monitoring role.33 Shleifer and Vishny
assume that management is inefficient, to the detriment of its share-
holders. 34 If the large shareholder discovers inefficiency and can im-
prove the value of the corporation, the large shareholder's return on
the shares makes up for costs incurred in monitoring and takeover 3
5
The bid made by the large shareholder is a function of the number of
shares held. The larger the holding, the smaller the bid premium-
but the larger the increase in the value of the firn. 36 If the large
shareholder can buy anonymously before the takeover bid, he or she
can deprive minority shareholders of any gain from the takeover.3 7
This has ramifications for disclosure under section 13(d) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934,38 which restricts the ability of a large
shareholder to buy anonymously.
The motives for conglomerate merger are still largely unknown,
but one hypothesis is that diversification reduces product line or in-
dustry risk.39 The merged firms have a reduced risk of default; this is
referred to as the "co-insurance effect."' 40 The implication is that a
reduction in risk should increase the value of the bonds at the expense
of the stockholders. Of course, in a perfect capital market, diversifica-
31. Social welfare is the expected valuation of the acquiring bidder minus the second
bidder's cost of investigation minus the bidding costs of both bidders. Id. at 601. Social
welfare varies directly with the cost of investigation. Id. Hirshleifer and Png show that the
expected price of the target corporation and social welfare increase with the cost of investi-
gation. Id. at 601-04. Conversely, they show that the effect of reducing the cost of investi-
gation is a reduction in the expected price of the target and a reduction in social welfare.
Id. at 603-04.
32. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,
94 J. POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
33. Id. at 461-62.
34. Id. at 463.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 464.
37. Id. at 475.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1988).
39. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Con-
glomerate Mergers, 12 BELL J. EcoN. 605, 605 (1981); E. Han Kim & John J. McConnell,
Corporate Mergers and the Co-insurance of Corporate Debt, 32 J. FiN. 349, 349 (1977).
40. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Conditions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-
player Game, 78 GEo. LJ. 1495, 1501 (1990).
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tion through conglomerate merger is unnecessary because sharehold-
ers can achieve their own degree of risk through portfolio
diversification.
J. Fred Weston, Keith V. Smith, and Ronald E. Shrieves rejected
diversification as a risk-reducing mechanism because they found be-
tas41 of the merged firms to be nearly twice as high as those of compa-
rable mutual funds.42 They concluded that conglomerate mergers may
reduce product line risk but increase general economic risk.43 Han
Kim and John J. McConnell, on the other hand, concluded that there
was a co-insurance effect, but it was offset by increased use of debt
financing.' Their findings are consistent with the assumption that
managers act in the best interests of the shareholders-at least where
there is a conflict between shareholders and bondholders. Yakov
Amihud and Baruch Lev hypothesize that managers engage in con-
glomerate mergers to diversify their employment risk since human
capital is not divisible.45 The implication is that managers are acting
not in the best interests of the shareholders or the corporation, but in
their own. This type of activity is more likely to occur in manager-
controlled firms than owner-controlled firms.
Michael C. Jensen's free cash flow theory is relevant here because
one of the empirical implications of the hypothesis is that acquiring
corporations should have free cash flow or excess debt capacity.46
Jensen asserts that managers have incentives to cause their firms to
expand beyond their optimal sizes.47 Such firms generate large
amounts of free cash flow.48 Rather than pay out the free cash flow to
shareholders, managers seek other alternatives, including merger or
takeover. Jensen argues that his free cash flow theory predicts that
such mergers and takeovers are more likely to destroy, rather than
41. "Beta" is a term of art used to designate financial risk. Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis
A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 761, 761 (1985).
42. J. Fred Weston et al., Conglomerate Performance Using the Capital Asset Pricing
Model, 54 REv. ECON. & STAT. 357, 360 (1972).
43. Id. at 362.
44. Kim & McConnell, supra note 39, at 349.
45. Amihud & Lev, supra note 39, at 606.
46. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 ABA PAPERS & PROc. 323, 328 (1986).
47. Id. at 323.
48. Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that needed to fund all positive net present
value projects. Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES RIGULATION ch. 6, § D.1
(1993).
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create, value because managers will undertake low- or negative-bene-
fit mergers or takeovers just to expend free cash flow. 49
This Article examines the problem created when target managers
do not fund available positive net present value projects and thereby
avoid maximizing the value of the corporation. Under these circum-




A corporation that does not maximize its value by investing in
positive net present value projects may become a takeover target or
seek out slack-rich corporations as suitors to finance projects without
issuing equity securities. A merger or tender offer by a slack-rich cor-
poration is assumed to be an all-cash transaction; thus, evaluation of
its securities is not an issue. Further, the slack-poor corporation has
not announced any issue-invest decision regarding the project.
The analysis in this Article utilizes the Myers and Majluf model.50
Stewart Myers and Nicholas Majluf created a single-period model
showing that under certain conditions firms may pass up positive net
present value projects if they must issue equity to finance them.51
Consider a firm that has a single asset in place and an investment op-
portunity that must be financed in whole or in part by issuing equity.
The firm does not have sufficient cash or other marketable securities
on hand to finance the project. Further, there are no taxes, transac-
tion costs, or other market imperfections, and investors are rational.
Myers and Majluf assume asymmetric information, and that managers
act in the best interest of old shareholders who are assumed to be
passive-that is, shareholders who will not rebalance their portfolios
in response to the firm's actions.
The Myers and Majluf model is a three-date model.5' At t = -1,
both the market and managers have the same information. At t = 0,
managers receive information concerning the value of the asset in
place and the project that is unknown to the market. At t = +1, the
market receives the information that managers received at t = 0. The
49. Jensen, supra note 46, at 328.
50. See Stewart C. Myers & Nicholas S. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment
Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J. FIN. EcoN. 187
(1984).
51. Id. at 188.
52. Id. at 190.
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value of the asset in place at t = -1 is the expected future value, A =
E(A), where the distribution of A is the possible values of the asset in
place at t = 0. Management information received at t = 0 is the up-
dated estimate 'a,' which is the realization of A. Similarly, the net
present value (NPV) of the project at t = -1 is B = E(B), where f
represents the possible NPVs of the project at t = 0. Management
receives the updated estimate 'b' at t = 0. Both 'a' and 'b' are as-
sumed to be nonnegative. S, the amount of slack-cash and equity
securities-on hand, is known by both the market and managers. Eq-
uity is issued if 0 < S _< 1, where I is the amount of investment needed
to finance the project. 3
Myers and Majluf show that managers will issue equity and invest
only if S + a < [P / (P + E)](E + S + a + b), where P is the "old
shares" market value if stock is issued and E = I - S.14 The old share-
holders' share of the firm with investment must be greater than or
equal to the value of the firm without investment in the project.5 If
this condition does not obtain, managers will pass up the positive net
present value project and not maximize the value of the firm. 6
In this model it is assumed that target shareholders are atomistic;
however, for purposes of target management acting in the best inter-
est of its shareholders, the existence of a large shareholder does not
alter the result. In a contest for corporate control where the large
shareholder is a bidder, there may be an effect if the large shareholder
has an information advantage. It is further assumed that no share-
holder has an information advantage over any other. Instead, the
asymmetry of information is between target management, which has
the information advantage, and its shareholders and the market.
First, consider an aggressive, slack-rich corporation seeking take-
over targets. The assumption of asymmetric information is main-
tained in that managers of the target, slack-poor corporation have
inside information about their corporation that the slack-rich, acquir-
ing corporation managers do not have. This is the opposite informa-
tion asymmetry utilized by Giammarino and Heinkel in their 1986
paper and Hirshleifer and Png in their 1989 paper. 7 They assume
that an informed bidder has an information advantage over both an
53. See id. at 189-94.
54. Id at 190.
55. Id at 192.
56. Id at 188.
57. See Giammarino & Heinkel, supra note 10, at 466-67; Hirshleifer & Png, supra
note 20, at 596.
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uninformed bidder and the target corporation's management.58 Here,
both sets of managers, acquiring and target, know the distributions of
A and B. Only the slack-poor, target corporation managers know the
updated estimates of 'a' and 'b.'
The slack-rich, acquiring corporation could acquire the slack-
poor, target corporation and either sell off its component parts or con-
tinue its operations by financing the positive net present value project.
Under Revlon, if the cash-poor target corporation is to be put on the
auction block and its assets sold, the target management is under an
obligation to maximize its shareholders' value.59 Managers know the
updated estimate 'a'; hence, they must get at least S + a in the transac-
tion to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the shareholders. The acquiring
corporation will only be willing to offer S + A in the absence of inside
information. A holdout or opposition by the target corporation's
managers could be interpreted as a signal that the updated estimated
value of 'a' exceeds A. It would be in the best interests of the share-
holders of the target corporation, however, for management to hold
out for a higher value, thereby sending a false signal concerning the
true values of 'a.' If the acquiring corporation believed the false
signal and paid an amount greater than S + a for the target corpora-
tion, the shareholders of the slack-poor, target corporation would
benefit at the expense of the shareholders of the slack-rich, acquiring
corporation.
Second, a slack-rich corporation-one with slack in excess of its
needs or opportunities-can acquire one or more slack-poor corpora-
tions with unfinanced positive net present value projects. Assuming
sufficient slack to internally finance the projects, such an acquisition
would create value and support the notion that the merged corpora-
tions have a synergistic value greater than the sum of the parts.
60
58. Giammarino & Heinkel, supra note 10, at 467; see Hirshleifer & Png, supra note
20, at 591.
59. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
60. This would be true if the managers of the acquiring corporation accurately assessed
the value of the target corporation. The empirical studies attempting to measure synergy
produce mixed results. See, for example, Peter Dodd & Richard Ruback, Tender Offers
and Stock Returns: An Empirical Analysis, 5 J. FiN. ECON. 351 (1977) and Paul J. Halpern,
Empirical Estimates of the Amount and Distribution of Gains to Companies in Mergers, 46
J. Bus. 554 (1973), for articles supporting the synergy theory. On the other hand, Jensen's
free cash flow theory predicates that mergers and takeovers are likely to destroy rather
than create value. Jensen, supra note 46, at 328. Jensen's theory asserts that managers
spend cash on value-destroying mergers rather than distributing that cash to shareholders.
Id. However, this is not the case here. The target corporation has untapped value in the
positive net present value project. A more troublesome problem is presented by Roll's
January 1995]
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Maintaining the assumption of asymmetric information requires
that the acquiring corporation know the distributions of A and P, but
not the updated estimated values 'a' and 'b.' The offer for the target,
cash-poor corporation would be less than or equal to S + A + f but
greater than the market value of the stock. Such an offer would, ex
ante, make the shareholders of both corporations better off. The tar-
get corporation's shareholders are better off because the market value
of their stock is discounted to less than S + A + Abecause of the
unfinanced positive net present value project and incomplete informa-
tion. Moreover, the target corporation's shareholders are also better
off if the offer exceeds S + a. In the absence of the merger, the value
of the target corporation is the sum of the slack plus the value of the
asset in place, S + a, since the positive net present value project will be
not be undertaken. Any aggregate offer in excess of S + a increases
the value of the target shareholders' claim. The acquiring, slack-rich
corporation's shareholders are better off because they get all or part
of the unfinanced positive net present value project's unrealized
value.
Target managers know the updated estimates 'a' and 'b'; hence,
they must get at least S + a + b in the transaction to fulfill their fiduci-
ary duty to the corporation. Rational managers of the acquiring cor-
poration should be willing to offer only S + A + P in the absence of
inside information.6 A holdout or opposition by the target corpora-
tion's managers could be interpreted as a signal that the updated esti-
mated values of 'a' and 'b' exceed A and B. It would be in the best
interests of the shareholders of the target corporation, however, for
management to hold out for a higher value, thereby sending a false
signal concerning the true values of 'a' and 'b.' If the acquiring corpo-
ration's managers believed the false signal and paid an amount greater
than S + a + b for the target corporation, the shareholders of the
slack-poor, target corporation would benefit at the expense of the
shareholders of the slack-rich, acquiring corporation. Indeed, Robert
Jennings and Michael Mazzeo found that target management resist-
hubris hypothesis.* Roll asserts that managers are overly optimistic in evaluating target
corporations and overpay. Roll, supra note 7, at 198, 212. For an empirical study showing
no synergistic value, see Terence C. Langetieg, An Application of a Three-Factor Perform-
ance Index to Measure Stockholder Gains from Merger, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (1978).
61. Jennings and Mazzeo show, however, that bidders revise offers in favor of the tar-
get even in the face of adverse market reaction to the announcement. Robert H. Jennings
& Michael A. Mazzeo, Stock Price Movements Around Acquisition Announcements and
Management's Response, 64 J. Bus. 139, 160 (1991).
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ance increased the likelihood that the acquiring corporation would re-
vise its offer to the benefit of the target.62
It may be that the updated estimates of 'a' and 'b' are less than A
and . In this case, in a nonnegotiated merger, the target corpora-
tion's managers need not oppose the merger to fulfill their fiduciary
duty. However, if the acquiring corporation's managers observe that
the target corporation's managers are not opposing the merger, they
may take that action as a signal that they overbid for the target corpo-
ration and back out if possible.63 Therefore, even if a < A and b <AP,
the target corporation's managers should hold out or oppose the
merger in the best interests of the slack-poor, target corporation's
shareholders.
The best strategy for the managers of a target corporation is al-
ways to hold out or oppose the merger.' Easterbrook and Fischel
argued that managers of target corporations should be bound by a
"rule of managerial passivity" that would prohibit target managers
from soliciting a competing bid or opposing a takeover.65 The law,
however, is to the contrary-a fact the two researchers recognized by
calling for the repeal of the Williams Act.66 Developments in state
corporation law have encouraged target opposition to takeover bids.
67
State takeover statutes tend to be paternalistic by protecting local
businesses.6" State legislatures assume that the interests of local in-
cumbent managers are identical to the state's public policy.69 This in-
troduces an element of agency costs-associated with managers seeking
to preserve their own positions. Consequently, their action cannot be
used as a signal to the acquiring corporation's managers as to the true
value of the target corporation, S + a + b. The target corporation's
shareholders are not harmed since their stock is discounted in the
62. Id. at 154.
63. Proposed acquisitions may fail for a host of reasons such as a lack of response,
resistance by the target, or the occurrence of a condition precedent which terminates the
proposal. Jennings and Mazzeo studied 472 proposed'acquisitions between June 1, 1979,
and December 31, 1987. Id. at 161. A total of 121, or approximately one-quarter, of these
proposed acquisitions were canceled. Id. Forty-seven were canceled by the acquiring cor-
poration alone. Id
64. See Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State
Regulations of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980) (concluding that effect of
federal and state regulation is to raise price bid for target corporation).
65. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 27, at 1164.
66. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1988).
67. See infra notes 259-63 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 409.511-.546 (Vernon 1990); N.Y. Bus. Corp. LAw
§§ 1602, 1612 (McKinney 1986).
69. See, e.g., Icahn v. Blunt, 612 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
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market, due to the asymmetric information and unfinanced positive
net present value project, to less than S + A + A-the maximum offer
the acquiring corporation should make without inside information.
Any merger offer amount between the discounted market value of the
target corporation stock and S + A + B inures to the benefit of the
target corporation's shareholders. Further, any offer greater than S +
a, the value of the firm without investment in the project, increases
the value of the target shareholders' claim and should be accepted.
A slack-poor corporation may aggressively seek a merger with a
slack-rich corporation. This action may be interpreted as a signal that
the slack-poor corporation has an unfinanced, positive net present
value project and is seeking outside financing for that project through
a merger. Without the investment the true value of the slack-poor
corporation is S + a; however, the market value of the slack-poor cor-
poration is less than or equal to S + A + B. By seeking the merger,
the slack-poor corporation could be signalling that S + a + b > S + A +
B. The problem, however, is that the managers of the slack-poor cor-
poration have an incentive to lie.
Assume that S + a + b < S + A + A and that only the managers of
the slack-poor corporation know the updated estimates of 'a' and 'b.'
The slack-poor corporation's managers would seek a merger in which
they would be willing to accept any amount between S + a and S + A
+±B, where S + a < S + a + b < S + A +/P. The medium of exchange
has an effect. Jensen's free cash flow theory predicts that takeovers
financed with cash and debt create greater benefits than those fi-
nanced through the exchange of stock.70 Similarly, empirical evidence
shows that the market reacts more favorably to cash offers than to
stock exchanges. 71 In an exchange of stock, target shareholders are at
risk on the downside if the acquiring corporation's managers overbid;
however, if there is synergy from the merger, target shareholders will
benefit at the expense of acquiring shareholders. The shareholders of
the slack-poor corporation would benefit at the expense of the share-
holders of the slack-rich corporation for any cash offer greater than S
+ a + b. Indeed, it may be assumed that the more aggressive the man-
agers of the slack-poor corporation are in seeking a merger, the less
70. Jensen, supra note 46, at 329.
71. See Paul Asquith et al., Gains to Bidding Firms From Merger, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 121
(1983); Yen-Sheng Huang & Ralph A. Walkling, Target Abnormal Returns Associated with
Acquisition Announcements: Payment, Acquisition Form and Managerial Resistance, 19 J.
FIN. ECON. 329 (1987); Nickolaos G. Travlos, Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Pay-
men4 and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns, 42 J. FiN. 943 (1987).
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the true value, S + a + b, will be. Because no meaningful or useful
signal is given by the slack-poor corporation's managers' actions in
seeking a merger, without inside information the slack-rich corpora-
tion's managers should never offer more than S + A + B cash in a
merger. Nonetheless, S + A + B may be an overbid if the value of the
stock is overpriced, as in the case where S + a + b < S + A + B. Given
the tendency of acquiring corporations' managers to overbid, a stock
exchange benefits their shareholders.
The minimum acceptable offer from the viewpoint of the slack-
poor corporation's shareholders is S + a. Rational shareholders of the
slack-poor corporation should therefore reject any offer for less. A
merger offer is only acceptable to the slack-rich corporation if the of-
fer price is between the market price of the slack-poor corporation's
stock and S + A + B, and if the stock is undervalued, that is, S + a + b
> market price. A merger is acceptable to both parties only if (1) S + a
+ b > S + A + B > offer price > S + a > market price; or (2) S + A + B
S + a + b >_ offerprice > S + a->!marketprice; or (3) S + a + b > S + A +
B > offer price > market price > S + a; or (4) S + A + > S + a + b >
offer price > market price > S + a. The proposed merger should fail in
all other cases. Since the updated estimates 'a' and 'b' are known
only to the slack-poor corporation's managers, the only conclusion the
slack-rich corporation's managers can reach from the slack-poor cor-
poration's acceptance of the offer is that the offer price is greater than
S+ a. They know S + A + B but not S + a + b. The relative position
of the offer price vis-a-vis S + a + b is unknown to the managers of the
slack-rich corporation. Certainly, the merger is unacceptable to them
if the offer price exceeds S_+ a + b. Cautious management of a slack-
rich corporation would not enter into any particular merger with a
slack-poor corporation, although on average it would be beneficial.
Where, in a merger situation, the slack-rich corporation offers an
amount less than or equal to S + A + B, Myers and Majluf show that
the slack-poor corporation is better off issuing equity and investing in
the positive net present value project itself.72 However, the slack-
poor corporation will not do so if the value of the corporation without
72. Myers & Majluf, supra note 50, at 202. The proof is as follows: Define a*(N') as
the breakeven value of a, the value at which the slack-poor firm is just indifferent to being
acquired at the equilibrium price Q'. Note that Q = a*(N') + S. Recall that the require-
ment for a corporation to issue stock is (E / P)(S + a) > E + b. If P were equal to Q', the
corporation would issue and invest in a*(N') for any b > 0. That is, since P = Q" = S +
a*(N'), (E / P)(S + a) = [E / (S + a*(N'))](S + a*(N')) = E < E + b. Thus a*(M'), the
breakeven value of a at which the firm is just willing to issue stock, exceeds a*(N') for any
b > 0. Thus, A(M') + i(M') > A(N') + B(N') and P > Q'.
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investment is greater than the old shareholders' aliquot share of the
corporation with investment. The slack-poor corporation will only ac-
cept the merger terms if the offer price exceeds S + A + A, but without
inside information the slack-rich corporation should never offer more
than S + A + A. Under these conditions no merger would take place.
Mergers, however, do take place. Ironically, one of the key take-
over indicators making a corporation particularly vulnerable to a take-
over is the type of management-stockholder structure that Myers and
Majluf described in their 1984 paper.73 Slack-rich acquiring corpora-
tions obtain inside information from the slack-poor corporation's
managers and S + a + b > S + A + f, or they foolishly offer more than
S + A + A3-which is not acceptable if managers are rational. Alterna-
tively, the slack-poor corporation's managers accept terms less than S
+ A + f, particularly if S + a + b < S + A + A3-which is not necessar-
ily acting exclusively in the best interest of their shareholders.
A cash tender offer to the slack-poor corporation's shareholders
may circumvent this problem. Typically, the value of the considera-
tion offered to the target shareholders includes a premium to obtain
control and thus exceeds the market value of the stock. In this model
the consideration represents an amount between the market price and
S + A + A. This strategy may succeed because neither party has inside
information. A cash tender offer for the slack-poor corporation's
stock would not convey any bad news to the market or the slack-poor
corporation's shareholders since the offer would not be based on in-
side information concerning the updated estimated values of 'a' and
'b,' which are known only by the slack-poor, target corporation's
management.
Target shareholders wishing to "tender" their shares do so by for-
warding their stock to the tender offeror's agent, usually a depository
bank.74 The tender offer is usually left open for a fixed period of time
which may be extended.7' Commonly, the tender offer is conditioned
on the occurrence of certain events, such as tender of all or a stated
73. Raymond S. Troubh, Characteristics of Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1301
(1977).
74. See HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, AcQuIsmoNs AND BuyouTS 473 (Steven James
Lee & Robert Douglas Colman eds., 1981); THi MERGERS AND AcQuISmONS HAND-
BOOK 423 (Milton L. Rock ed., 1987).
75. The minimum period that a tender offer must remain open is 20 business days.
Hirshleifer & Png, supra note 20, at 587 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1994)). However,
the length of time may be affected by the type of offer. Cash tender offers require only a
15-day minimum. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(1). Also, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or
the Attorney General have discretion to extend the open period. Id. § 18a(e)(2).
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part or percentage of the target shares, a favorable antitrust ruling, or
the tender offeror's ability to obtain financing.76
The advantages of a tender offer are that (1) as a nonnegotiated
takeover, it is generally cheaper than a proxy fight; (2) if it is not suc-
cessful, the tender offeror still has its investment in the acquired target
stock and may be able to dispose of it at a profit;77 (3) a tender offer is
faster; and (4) secrecy is easier to maintain. Tender offers are fre-
quently followed by mergers unless prohibited by state takeover stat-
utes that impose postacquisition restrictions on business
combinations.78
Tender offers may be used to circumvent target management in a
hostile takeover situation. David Hirshleifer and Sheridan Titman
construct a model for hostile takeovers.79 In their model, unlike the
model employed here, there is one potential acquirer-a minority
shareholder of the target corporation.80 All other shareholders are
atomistic81 The potential acquirer has only one opportunity to bid,
and if the offer is rejected, that person loses the synergistic value.'
Hirshleifer and Titman show that the optimal bid is a strictly increas-
ing function of the improvement in value resulting from the, takeover;
this is rational because the greater the potential gain, the more the
potential acquirer is willing to bid.83 This results in a separating out-
come in that the bidders reveal the level of improvement through
their bids.' Low improvement value results in a low bid while high
improvement value results in a high bid. 5
What the potential bidder does not know is the price at which the
atomistic shareholders will tender as a result of personal costs and
benefits of tendering not known to the bidder.86 The asymmetry of
information is between the large shareholder and atomistic sharehold-
76. See HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS AND Buyotrrs, supra note 74, at 475.
77. There is evidence that positive, cumulative abnormal returns persist for approxi-
mately two years after a failed takeover bid, thus providing the basis for a gain. Michael
Bradley et al., The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: Information or Synergy? 11
J. FIN. ECON. 183, 185-86 (1983).
78. See infra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
79. David Hirshleifer & Sheridan Titman, Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of
Hostile Takeover Bids, 98 J.-POL. ECON. 295 (1990).
80. Id. at 298.
81. I&
82. Id. at 298-99.
83. Id. at 300.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 302.
86. Id. at 297.
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ers of the same target corporation. Hirshleifer and Titman imply that
a reduction in the degree of asymmetry of information between the
large shareholder and the others increases the probability of success8 7
Such is not the case in the model used in this Article because there is
no difference in the degree of asymmetry of information. Both parties
are ignorant of the true or updated estimated values of 'a' and 'b.'
The Hirshleifer and Titman results only obtain if the potential ac-
quirer, the large shareholder, has superior information. That model
also shows that for a tender offer to be profitable, dilution of the mi-
nority holdings is not necessary, as Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart
modelled.m
Rejection of a bid is costly to the bidder, who loses both the im-
provement value and costs incurred in investigation and bidding. Re-
jection also allows target management time to react and organize to
oppose the hostile takeover. Hirshleifer and Titman examine defen-
sive actions of management, including "poison pill," "sale of the
crown jewels," and litigation. 9 In such cases, the likelihood of failure
increases.90
A major problem for a potential acquirer who holds a minority of
the shares and attempts a hostile takeover is a control-share statute
such as that enacted in Indiana.9' Indiana's control-share statute with-
stood scrutiny by the United States Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America.92 More than one-half of the states have
enacted some form of control-share statute modelled after the Indiana
statute. 93 The purpose of a control-share statute is to keep the ac-
quirer from exercising the voting power of the acquired stock, thereby
rendering the acquirer powerless to make the changes necessary to
reap improvement value.94 Whenever an entity acquires control at a
level defined in the statute-twenty percent, thirty-three and one-
third percent, or more than fifty percent-it is not necessarily entitled
to vote those control shares. 95 The control shares cannot be voted
unless a resolution is passed by a majority of disinterested shares of
87. Id. at 304-05.
88. See Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 42 (1980).
89. Hirshleifer & Titman, supra note 79, at 308-15.
90. See id. at 308.
91. See IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1989).
92. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
93. See Mark J. Loewenstein, The SEC and the Future of Corporate Governance, 45
ALA. L. REv. 783 (1994).
94. See IND. COM ANN. § 23-1-42-9.
95. Id. § 23-1-42-1.
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each class entitled to vote on the resolution.91 Disinterested share-
holders are those other than the acquirer or officers and inside direc-
tors of the acquired corporation.97 The effect is to condition control
of the corporation on the approval of a majority of the old, disinter-
ested shareholders of the target corporation
98
In the model used in this Article, the managers of the slack-poor
corporation may oppose the cash tender offer and advise their share-
holders to reject the offer and hold out for a higher amount, possibly
greater than S + A + B. Without inside information concerning the
updated estimated values of 'a' and 'b,' the slack-rich firm should
never offer more than S + A + B. Ex ante, both the slack-poor corpo-
ration's shareholders and the slack-rich corporation would be better
off if an offer between the market price and S + A + B were accepted.
However, the shareholders of the slack-poor corporation may be mis-
led by their managers as to the true value of the corporation and re-
fuse to tender. Ultimately, the shareholders must make their own
decision regarding the sufficiency of the offer. Management that
breaches its duty by intentionally inflating the value of the slack-poor
corporation and misleading its shareholders may be guilty of violating
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,99
and section 3 of the Williams Act."°
B. Legal Aspects
1. General antifraud provisions
The antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws apply to
securities whether or not they are exempt from registration and
whether or not they are transactionally exempt.1' 1 Consequently, the
antifraud provisions apply to the model under consideration in all cir-
cumstances. The primary antifraud provisions are section 17 of the
Securities Act of 1933,102 section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934,103 and section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940." 4
Section 10 is the catch-all provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Its purpose is to provide relief from abuses not otherwise
96. Id. § 23-1-42-9(b).
97. See id § 23-1-42-3.
98. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 74.
99. 15 U.S.C. 88 78a-78u (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
101. See id. §§ 77c, 77q(c).
102. Id. § 77q.
103. Id § 78j(b).
104. Id. § 80b-6.
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addressed in the Act."5 However, section 10 is not a self-executing
provision. It is only effective through rules and regulations promul-
gated by the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) pursuant to the
authority granted by section 10 to make such rules as are "necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of inves-
tors."'1 6 In 1948 the SEC issued rule 10b-5.107 Interestingly, rule 10b-
5 is merely modified language of section 17(a) of the Securities Act of
1933; the primary difference is that section 17(a) applies only to sale
of securities, whereas section 10 applies to both purchase and sale.108
Rule 10b-5 provides that
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate com-
merce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national se-
curities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon
any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security.109
Section 10 and rule 10b-5 are stated as prohibitions and give rise
to administrative proceedings," 0 suits for injunction by the SEC,"
and criminal actions referred to the Justice Department for prosecu-
tion." 2 However, it was established as early as 1946 that there was an
implied civil cause of action for damages on behalf of the defrauded
victim. 11
105. See id. § 78j(b).
106. Id.
107. In re Western Pub. Serv. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 3230, 13 Fed. Reg. 8183
(Dec. 22, 1948) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994)).
108. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994) (making unlawful any act of fraud or deceit
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security") with 15 U.S.C. § 77q (making
unlawful any act of "fraud or deceit upon the purchaser").
109. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(a)(1), 78u-1(a)(1).
111. Id. § 78u(d).
112. Id. § 78ff(a).
113. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
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The elements of a cause of action under rule 10b-5 are (1) use of
the mails, an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or any facility of
a national securities exchange; (2) a purchase or sale of a security; (3)
fraud or deceit or a misstatement or omission of a material fact; (4)
scienter; (5) causation; (6) reliance; and (7) damages in a civil ac-
tion." 4 A private cause of action must be brought by a purchaser or
seller;"'5 this requirement is strictly applied.'16 A merger entails a
purchase and sale of a security."
17
Two of the three clauses of rule 10b-5 deal with fraud or deceit."
8
Fraud does not include overreaching by a controlling shareholder un-
less it is accompanied by actual deception." 9 A cause of action for
fraud under rule 10b-5 is similar to common-law fraud in that there
must be a relationship between the parties that gives rise to a duty
that is violated.' z In insider trading cases, the insider, by virtue of his
or her position, gains access to information intended for corporate
purposes and not personal benefit.' 2' The corresponding duty is to
abstain from the marketplace until the information is made public.
22
The insider must not take unfair advantage of information unknown
to persons with whom the insider is dealing. In many instances the
courts are not clear as to which clause of rule 10b-5 applies, particu-
larly in insider trading cases."
Clause (b) of rule 10b-5 deals with misstatements and omissions
of material facts.'24 A fact is material if it is the kind of information
that a reasonable investor would consider important in making an in-
vestment decision.12 In the context of an untrue statement of a mate-
rial fact, the intentional misstatement is akin to common-law fraud.2
114. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976);
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462,468-69,471 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
115. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
116. See id.
117. SEC v. National Sec., 393 U.S. 453, 467 (1969).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
119. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
120. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933).
121. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,227-28 (1980); In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,
40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
122. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236 (2d Cir.
1974); In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 640 (1971).123. See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (mentioning all
three clauses of rule 10b-5, but not stating which clause applies).
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
125. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
126. See Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 201.
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In the case of an omission of a material fact where there is a duty to
disclose, an element of conjecture is introduced. The test of material-
ity then becomes whether the reasonable investor would have acted
differently .had he or she known of the undisclosed fact.127
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hockfelder,lze scienter is a requirement of a cause of action
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 2 9 Scienter requires an intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.130 Negligence will not support a
cause of action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.131 However, the
Supreme Court reserved the, issue of whether recklessness is
equivalent to intentional conduct.132 Breach of fiduciary duty without
an allegation of deception or misrepresentation is not actionable
under rule 10b-5. 33
Causation is a necessary element of a cause of action under sec-
tion 10(b) and rule 10b-5-the misrepresentation or fraud must be the
proximate cause of plaintiff's loss.'34 If the misrepresentation is of a
material fact on which plaintiff relied, but is not the reasonable direct
cause of the pecuniary loss, no recovery is allowed.1
35
In fraud cases and cases involving affirmative misstatements of
material facts, plaintiffs must show actual reliance.a36 However, if the
misleading statement constitutes a fraud on the market, plaintiff need
not show reliance but only that the security was bought or sold at a
price that was affected by the misleading statement. 37 The fraud-on-
the-market theory rests on the notion that the price of a security is
based on all available material information concerning the business.'
38
Misleading statements, therefore, affect market price. 39
Nondisclosure or complete omission cases present another prob-
lem. Plaintiffs must show that they would have relied on the facts if
they had been made known; in effect, this means that the omitted facts
127. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972).
128. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
129. Id. at 193.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 201.
132. Id. at 194 n.12.
133. Santa Fe Indus., 430 U.S. at 474-76.
134. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 154.
135. Id. at 153-54.
136. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965).
137. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248-49 (1988).
138. Id. at 241.
139. Id. at 241-42.
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were material. 1'0 In a nondisclosure case, if the plaintiff proves mate-
riality, reliance is established.
1
The measure of damages in most cases is the "out-of-pocket"
rule. 42 The award is based on the difference between the value of
what the plaintiff gave up and the value of what was received in the
transaction. 43 In the model used in this Article, the penalty for lying
is the difference between the misrepresented value and S + a + b. In
addition to damages awarded to a private plaintiff, the SEC may as-
sess a civil penalty up to three times the actual damage. 44 No puni-
tive damages are assessed in an antifraud case.145 The potential for
liability is great, especially in insider trading cases, because liability
extends to all persons who traded in the market during the time that
the inside information was undisclosed146 However, some courts at-
tempt to limit the defendant's liability. For example, the Sixth Circuit
requires "trading causation" between plaintiff's losses and defend-
ant's trading on the basis of the undisclosed information. 4 7
Knowing the amount of damages that can be assessed for viola-
tion of section 10(b), rule 10b-5, and section 14(e),148 the cost of lying
can be calculated. Court costs, attorneys' fees, and other costs are not
considered. If the managers of the slack-poor firm lie and inflate the
value of the firm, the gain from lying is the difference between the
inflated value, V, and the actual or true value, V. Based on the inside
knowledge of the updated estimates of 'a' and 'b,' the actual or true
value of the firm, 1, equals S + a + b. The cost of lying is the differ-
ence between the product of the probability of being caught, p, times
the gain and the product of the probability of not being caught, (1 -
p), times the gain. Thus, cost of lying = p(Vi - V,) - (1 - p) (V1 - V,).
Rearranged, cost of lying = (2p - 1) (VI - V). It pays to lie if the cost
of lying is negative, that is, (2p - 1) (VI - V,) < 0. Since (V - V) > 0-
140. Affiliated Ute, 406 U.S. at 153-54.
141. Id.
142. See 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(1); Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335,
1344-46 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring).
143. Green, 541 F.2d at 1344.
144. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2).
145. Id. § 78u-1(a)(3); see Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 977 (1969).
146. See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1004 (1971).
147. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1053
(1977).
148. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e); see infra notes 193-222
and accompanying text.
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otherwise, the lie is not beneficial-it pays to lie if (2p - 1) < 0 or p <
.5.
If the possibility of civil penalties, CP, under section 21A(a)(2) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934111 is added, cost of lying = p[(Vt -
Vt) + CP] - (1 - p)(V - V). Rearranged, cost of lying = (2p - 1)(Vt -
V,) + pCP < 0, which must be negative for lying to pay. Consequently,
[CP / (VI - V)] < [(1 - 2p) 1p]. Assuming the maximum civil penalty,
equal to three times (V - V), [(1 - 2p) 1p] > 3. For lying to pay, p <
.2. Managers must determine their subjective assessment of the
probability of being caught. If they believe that the probability of be-
ing caught is less than twenty percent, they will lie.
Knowing the cost of lying, the value of the firm, V, may be calcu-
lated. The value of the firm is equal to the false inflated value of the
firm, V, less the cost of lying: V = VI - cost of lying. Therefore, V = V
-- p[(V,- V) + CP] - (1 -p)(Vl- V). Simplifying, V = V,- pCP.
Finally, V = S + a + b -p CP. Thus, the value of the firm is the actual
or true value less the probability of being caught lying, times the civil
penalty imposed if caught. Since p < .2, the true value of the firm is
reduced by less than twenty percent of the maximum civil penalty.
Rule 10b-5 applies to preliminary merger negotiations when
there is either nondisclosure of a material fact when a duty to disclose
exists, or a misleading material misstatement or omission. °50 Both
sides in a negotiated merger-would probably prefer not to disclose any
information concerning the negotiations. Premature disclosure could
drive up the price of the stock, making the merger more expensive or
even causing the negotiations to be abandoned. Disclosure, if made,
could also be misleading and subject the parties to liability. On the
other hand, failure to disclose information where a duty to disclose
exists is actionable; but silence is not misleading absent a duty to dis-
close. 5' "No comment" is the equivalent of silence.
152
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,53 the United States Supreme Court
adopted the TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.'54 standard for ma-
teriality in preliminary negotiation cases. 55 Additionally, the Court
stated that materiality must be determined on a case-by-case basis,
149. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(2).
150. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231-32, 238.
151. Id. at 231-32.
152. In re Carnation Co., [1984-1985 'fTransfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
83,801, at 87,595 n.6 (July 8, 1985).
153. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
154. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
155. Basic, 485 U.S. at 249 (citing TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
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balancing the probability that the transaction will be consummated
and its magnitude or significance to the issuer. 56 The Court rejected
the Third Circuit's standard, set out in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. ,1'7
that merger discussions were not material until agreements with re-
spect to price and structure of the transaction had been determined.
5 8
Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 apply in a negotiated merger situa-
tion.15 9 Using the slack-rich-slack-poor model, if the slack-rich corpo-
ration seeks to negotiate a merger or the slack-poor corporation's
managers actively seek out a slack-rich corporation; the preliminary
negotiations may contain material facts that must be disclosed to the
target corporation's shareholders. Information concerning price
would be of the utmost importance to the slack-poor, target corpora-
tion's shareholders and, therefore, material. If the slack-poor corpo-
ration's managers distort or lie about the updated estimates of 'a' and
'b' in the negotiations, such action could constitute a misstatement of
a material fact. This would subject the managers of the slack-poor,
target corporation to liability for violation of section 10(b) and rule
10b-5. If the managers distort or lie about the value of the slack-poor
corporation to their shareholders when disclosing the negotiations or
recommending approval of the merger-that is, if a shareholder vote
is required-they violate section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Interestingly
enough, if the directors of the slack-poor corporation and all of the
old shareholders are involved in the fraud on the slack-rich corpora-
tion with respect to the true value of the slack-poor corporation, the
slack-poor corporation could recover on the basis of a plan to defraud
future shareholders. 60 Potential liability under section 10(b) and rule
10b-5 provides an incentive for managers to tell the truth about the
value of the corporation if disclosure is required. The effectiveness of
that incentive depends on the managers' perception of the possibility
of being subjected to such liability. It has already been established
that that probability is not high.
2. Tender offers and the Williams Act' 6 '
Mergers and sales of all of the assets require action by the board
of directors of the target corporation. 62 A hostile board of directors
156. Id. at 250.
157. 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1984).
158. Basic, 485 U.S. at 236.
159. Id. at 232.
160. See Bailes v. Colonial Press, Inc., 444 F.2d 1241, 1244 (5th Cir..1971).
161. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f).
162. See Ordower v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 999 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1993).
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generally means instant doom to a merger or sale. A direct confronta-
tion with a hostile board of directors may be avoided by dealing di-
rectly with the shareholders of the target corporation by offering to
buy their stock for cash, property, or other stock in a tender offer.
At first blush the definition of a tender offer seems straightfor-
ward. The problem is whether the tender offer is subject to the Wil-
liams Act. The term "tender offer" is not defined in the statutes, and
the SEC has refused to define it for fear that the definition would be
too restrictive and provide lawyers with a weapon to avoid regula-
tion.163 The SEC has promulgated a list of eight factors to aid in the
analysis, but at least one court has expressed concern as to whether
the factors were "either a permissible or a desirable interpretation of
the statute."'" The SEC's position, although not adopted, is set out in
Exchange Act Release No. 16,385 as Proposed Rule 14d-1(b)(1):
The term "tender offer" includes a "request or invitation for
tenders" and means one or more offers to purchase or solici-
tations of offers to sell securities of a single class, whether or
not all or any portion of the securities sought are purchased,
which
(i) During any 45-day period are directed to more than
10 persons and seek the acquisition of more than 5% of the
class of securities, except that offers by a broker (and its cus-
tomer) or by a dealer made on a national securities exchange
at the then current market or made in the over-the-counter
market at the then current market shall be excluded if in
connection with such offers neither the person making the
offers nor such broker or dealer solicits or arranges for the
solicitation of any order to sell such securities, and such bro-
ker or dealer performs only the customary functions of a
broker or dealer and receives no more than the broker's
usual and customary commission or the dealer's usual and
customary mark-up; or
(ii) Are not otherwise a tender offer under paragraph
(b)(1)(i) of this section, but which
(A) are disseminated in a widespread manner, (B) pro-
vide for a price which represents a premium in excess of the
greater of 5% of or $2 above the current market price and
163. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-
6159, 34-16,385, 44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,349-50 (Dec. 6, 1979).
164. Brascan, Ltd. v. Edper Equities, Ltd., 477 F. Supp. 773, 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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(C) do not provide for a meaningful opportunity to negotiate
the price and terms.16
Although tender offers have been the subject of many court
cases,166 the courts have yet to produce a clear, comprehensive defini-
tion of "tender offer." Congress understood the term to mean an of-
fer to buy or sell securities, or a solicitation of an offer to sell a
security through some sort of exchange of the securities for other con-
sideration.167 The courts have defined a conventional tender offer as
having three elements: a bid, a premium price, and a conditional obli-
gation to purchase all or a specified amount of the tendered shares. 68
However, courts recognize that an unconventional tender offer, such
as an open-market or block purchase, is but an attempt to gain control
of a corporation by purchasing shares without a formal tender offer. 69
The United States Supreme Court's test was articulated in SEC v.
Ralston Purina Co. 170 The test is whether, considering the totality of
the circumstances, "the particular class of persons affected needs the
protection of the [Securities Exchange Act of 1934]." 171 Courts have
held that certain transactions are not tender offers; such transactions
include a stock repurchase of a 9.9% voting block as "greenmail,"'
172
open-market transactions at or below the market price without active
solicitations, 73 the purchase of forty-two percent of a class of securi-
ties from only seven security holders, 74 and privately negotiated
purchases from large or substantial shareholders.175
A tender offer for the stock of a publicly held corporation is sub-
ject to the Williams Act'76 -sections 13(d) and (e) and 14(d), (e), and
165. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16,385,
44 Fed. Reg. 70,349, 70,358 (Dec. 6, 1979).
166. Se4 e.g., Brascan, 477 F. Supp. at 791; S-G Sec., Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp.
1114, 1124 (D. Mass. 1978).
167. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967) (statement of Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC).
168. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1978).
169. Id. at 1208; see, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977).
170. 346 U.S. 119 (1953).
171. Id. at 125.
172. Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1986).
173. SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985).
174. Stromfeld v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
175. Hanson Trust Pub. Co. v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
176. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m-78n.
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(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'77 Under section 13(d),
any person or group of persons who becomes the owner of more than
five percent of any class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934178 must file with the issuer of the
securities and with the SEC a statement setting forth (1) the back-
ground of the person or persons, (2) the source of the funds to be used
in the acquisition, (3) the purpose of the acquisition, (4) the number
of shares actually owned, and (5) any relevant contracts, arrange-
ments, or understandings concerning the ownership of the stock or its
acquisition.179 The statement must be filed within ten days of acquisi-
tion of the required percentage of stock.'
An accurate statement of the purpose of the acquisition is impor-
tant since, under Revlon, managers' fiduciary duties shift from the
corporation to the shareholders if the acquiring corporation intends to
sell the assets rather than continue the target corporation's opera-
tions.' 8' Managers of the target corporation may delay the tender of-
fer by alleging that the tender offeror has filed a false or misleading
Schedule 13D. A private right of action for injunctive relief under
section 13(d) is recognized in many circuits,a although no private
civil cause of action for damages is permitted. 8 3 A tender offeror's
failure to disclose its intent-to gain control or sell the assets, for ex-
ample-may result in injunctive relief granted to the target corpora-
tion's management."8 The tender offeror's past activities in takeovers
may or may not be used as evidence of intent depending on the
circuit.' 85
177. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-439, §§ 13(d)-(e), 14(d)-(f), 82
Stat. 454, 454-57 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)).
178. 15 U.S.C. §§-78a-78kk.
179. Id. § 78m(d)(1).,
180. Id
181. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d '173, 182 (Del.
1986).
182. See, e.g., Portsmouth Square, Inc. v. Shareholders Protective Comm., 770 F.2d 866
(9th Cir. 1985); Gearhart Indus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984);
Indiana Nat'l Corp.* v. Rich, 712 F.2d 1180 (7th Cir. 1983).
183. See, e.g., Rubin v. Posner, 701 F. Supp. 1041 (D. Del. 1988); Sanders v. Thrall Car
Mfg. Co., 582 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd-per curiam, 730 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1984);
Schnell v. Schnall, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,927 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 30, 1981).
184. See Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 248 (8th Cir. 1979);
General Aircraft Corp., 556 F.2d at 96-97.
185. See Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 292 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding past per-
formance not indicative of future performance). But see Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 561
F. Supp. 301, 308 (S.D.N.Y.) (finding past history persuasive), appeal dismissed, 718 F.2d
26 (2d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 28:507
PROFITS OF DECEIT IN MERGERS
Under section 14(d) no person may make a tender offer that
would result in his or her owning more than five percent of a class of
securities required to be registered under section 12 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 unless the filing has been made with the SEC
and a copy of the filing is furnished to each offeree. 186 The informa-
tion to be contained in the statement is essentially the same informa-
tion that is required under section 13(d).' 8 7
When managers of a target corporation solicit or recommend to
their shareholders that they accept or reject a tender offer bid they
must ifie a Schedule 14D-9 with the SEC.188 The rationale for these
disclosure requirements was aptly stated by the Second Circuit in
Chris-Craft Industries v. Piper Aircraft Corp.:189
By reason of the special relationship between them, share-
holders are likely to rely heavily upon the representations of
corporate insiders when the shareholders find themselves in
the midst of a battle for control. Corporate insiders there-
fore have a special responsibility to be meticulous and pre-
cise in their representations to shareholders.
190
Management's position statement, as required by rule 14e-2, consti-
tutes a solicitation or recommendation for purposes of rule 14d-9.191
Item 4 requires disclosure of management's position regarding the of-
fer, so if the price is stated to be inadequate, reasons must be given to
support that position.'92 The shareholders of the target corporation
receive the information in the Schedule 14D-9 because, in practice,
the document is used without attachments as part of the initial com-
munication to shareholders following the tender offer bid.
Section 14(e) makes it unlawful for any person to misstate or
omit a material fact, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or ma-
nipulative acts or practices, in connection with a tender offer. 93
While there is no specific cause of action granted to shareholders of
the target corporation under section 14(e), the United States Supreme
Court has implied one in Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Chris-Craft Indus-
186. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1).
187. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-100 (1994) (stating disclosure requirements under
section 14(d)) with id. § 240.13d-101 (stating disclosure requirements under section 13(d)).
188. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(a)(1).
189. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
190. Id. at 364-65.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(f).
192. Id. § 240.14d-9(4).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
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tries. 94 Violation of section 14(e) is the most common claim asserted
by the target corporation's managers and shareholders. As a result,
judges are becoming skeptical and reluctant to entertain such
claims.19s
Standing is granted to the target corporation to bring suit for in-
junctive relief to prohibit the tender offer but not for damages;196 like-
wise, the tender offeror does not have standing to sue the target
corporation management for damages.197 A tender offeror has stand-
ing to sue a competing tender offeror for injunctive relief'98 but not
for damages.199 Under section 14(e) a nontendering target corpora-
tion's shareholder has standing to sue since the statutory element is
"in connection with" a tender offer rather than the "purchase or sale"
of a security as under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.200
The elements of a cause of action under 14(e) are similar to those
required under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The test for materiality
in tender offer cases201 was actually set out in a proxy case under sec-
tion 14(a): A fact is material if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable share-
holder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote.... [T]here must be a substantial likelihood that the
disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total
mix" of information made available.32
194. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
195. See, e.g., Macfadden Holdings, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp., 802 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1986); Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Diamond v. Arend, 649 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
196. See, e.g., Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1985);
E.H.I. of Florida, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 499 F. Supp. 1053 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd,
652 F.2d 310 (3d Cir. 1981); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd,
682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
197. Piper Aircraft, 430 U.S. at 42.
198. E.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 982 (1982); Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451
F. Supp. 468 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978).
199. Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 769 F.2d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1985).
200. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952); Wellman, 475 F. Supp. at 817; In re Commonwealth OiliTesoro Petroleum
Corp. Sec. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 227, 242 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life
Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1368 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
201. See Piper Aircraft, 430 U.S. at 50.
202. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449 (footnote omitted).
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The courts have taken a relatively pragmatic approach to materiality
rather than engaging in a "nit-picking" exercise. 3 This relaxation of
the standard in takeovers occurs because both sides are represented
by opposing forces, making it more likely that all material information
will be disclosed by one or the other of the parties.' 4 Moreover, in
contested control situations, some courts consider the failure of one of
the contestants to take remedial action with respect to an alleged mis-
statement or omission to be evidence that the alleged misstatement or
omission is not material205 Any significant relationship between the
tender offeror and the target managers is material to an evaluation of
the target managers' recommendations to their shareholders.' 6
Scienter, which is required in a section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
case,207 may or may not be required in a section 14(e) case. The lan-
guage of section 14(e) that declares it unlawful to make an untrue
statement or omit a material fact20 8 can be read as not requiring scien-
ter. Conversely, the language concerning fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices2°9 can be read as requiring scienter. To
date, the United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this question;
however, several lower courts have held that scienter is a required
element under section 14(e).z10
Causation and reliance in a section 14(e) case are essential ele-
ments of a private civil cause of action.21' Section 14(e) causation is
often analyzed in the context of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 material-
ity and reliance; causation and reliance are presumed in an omission
case if materiality is proved.
2 12
203. See Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir.
1979); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 267 (3d Cir.), cerL denied, 409
U.S. 874 (1972).
204. See Seaboard World Airlines, 600 F.2d at 364; Kennecott Copper, 584 F.2d at 1200;
Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 1975).
205. Kennecott Copper, 584 F.2d at 1200 n.4; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d
833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
206. Bell v. Cameron Meadows Land Co., 669 F.2d 1278, 1282 (9th Cir. 1982).
207. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 298 F. Supp. 66, 97 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd and
modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
209. Id.
210. E.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281,1299 n.17 (2d Cir. 1973); A &
K Railroad Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R. Co., 437 F. Supp. 636, 642 (E.D. Vis.
1977).
211. Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310,1323-24 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Halle
& Stieglitz, Filor, Bullard Inc. v. Empress Int'l, Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 217,223 (D. Del. 1977).
212. Kramas v. Security Gas & Oil, Inc., 672 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 459
U.S. 1035 (1982); Lewis v. McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195- (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951
(1980).
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As in the case of an alleged section 13(d) violation, a tender of-
feror's failure to disclose its plans and purposes-an intent to obtain
control or liquidate, for example-is actionable under section
14(e). 3 An accurate statement of the purpose of the acquisition is
important because, under Revlon, managers' fiduciary duties shift
from the corporation to the shareholders if the acquiring corporation
intends to sell the assets rather than continue the target corporation's
operations.214
In general the tender offeror may keep secret its own evaluations
or appraisals of the target c6rporation made with publicly available
information. 2 " The tender offeror, however, must disclose confiden-
tial information used in making the evaluation.216 In In re Envirodyne
Shareholders Litigation, the target corporation had considered the
possible sale of the corporation.217 Its largest shareholder, ARTRA,
had agreed to participate in the sale and consequently acquired confi-
dential inside information.218 The corporation received no offers and
thus abandoned attempts to sell.219 ARTRA's financial advisor, Salo-
mon Brothers, was made privy to the inside information and subse-
quently pursued a takeover bid for Envirodyne using the inside
information to formulate the offer price.22° The court held that the
inside information was material and must be disclosed to the target
corporation shareholders. 21
Likewise, other misuse of confidential, inside information consti-
tutes a violation of section 14(e).222 When the tender offeror receives
confidential inside information under a confidentiality agreement, or
from a former officer or director of the target corporation, the tender
offeror cannot properly use such information without disclosing it to
213. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 795 F. Supp. 484, 486 (D. Me.
1990); Koppers Co. v. American Express Co., 689 F. Supp. 1371, 1383-84 (W.D. Pa. 1988);
Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 209 (D. Md.), aff'd per curiam, 546
F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976).
214. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179.
215. Camelot Indus. Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1174, 1182-83
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
216. In re Envirodyne Indus. Shareholders Litig., No. 10702, 1989 WL 40792, at *7 (Del.
Ch. Apr. 17, 1989).
217, Id. at *3.-
218. Id. at *4.
219. Id.
220. Id. at *5.
221. ao. at *7.
222. Camelot Indus., 535 F. Supp. at 1182-83.
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the target corporation's shareholders. 2 However, disclosure may vi-
olate the agreement and may be actionable. Thus, the tender offeror
is in an untenable position; in such cases the tender offer typically is
not allowed to proceed. 24
A tender offer may be initiated in two different ways: by "bear
hug" or by a surprise announcement to the shareholders-directly
bypassing the target corporation's board.
In the bear hug approach, the acquiring corporation makes an
offer directly to the managers or board of directors of the target cor-
poration to acquire the target corporation at a fixed price. This ap-
proach does several things. The offer can be in preliminary form and
negotiable as a friendly takeover. Target directors are forced to dis-
close the offer to their shareholders, creating pressure on the directors
to accept.225 The preliminary negotiations may contain material facts
that must be disclosed to the target corporation's shareholders. Infor-
mation concerning price would be of the utmost importance to the
slack-poor, target corporation's shareholders and, therefore, material.
Rule 14e-2 requires the target corporation's managers, within ten
business days following an offer, to publish or send to their sharehold-
ers a statement that they (1) recommend acceptance or rejection of
the offer, (2) express no opinion and are neutral toward the offer, or
(3) are unable to take a position on the offer. 26 This statement must
disclose the reasons why management either took the position or re-
fuses to take a position.2 27 In the ten-day interim, the target corpora-
tion may evaluate the offer and communicate with its shareholders
provided, however, that the communication does no more than iden-
tify the bidder, state that the offer is being considered, state that the
corporation will issue its opinion regarding the offer within the ten-
day period, and request shareholders to wait until they are informed
223. LFC No. 31 Corp. v. Ransburg Corp., No. IP 88-1277-C, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17486 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 7, 1988); A. Copeland Enters., Inc. v. Guste, 1989-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH) [ 68,713 (E.D. La. Nov. 28, 1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1989); Murrary
Ohio Mfg. Co. v. AB Electrolux, No. 1-88-0387,1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16819 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 26, 1988).
224. Burlington Indus. v. Edelman, 666 F. Supp. 799 (M.D.N.C.), aff'd, [1987 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) [ 93,339 (4th Cir. June 22, 1987); General Portland, Inc.
v. La Farge Coppee S.A., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,148
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981).
225. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9; Basic, 485 U.S. at 224.
226. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2.
227. Id. § 240.14e-2(a)(3).
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of the corporation's position.2 s All communications must be fair and
in accordance with rule 10b-5 and section 14(e). 229
The courts scrutinize management's statements to shareholders,
particularly statements regarding the inadequacy of the price. A
statement that the price is inadequate is misleading if the target man-
agers are aware of nonpublic information that would dispute this con-
clusion.230 Therefore, if the slack-poor corporation's managers lie to
their own shareholders about the updated estimates of 'a' and 'b' in
determining the adequacy of the tender offer, they may be liable
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 as well as section 14(e). The incen-
tive to tell the truth may solve the asymmetric information problem in
bear hug tender offers. The offeror has inside information only if it is
acquired from the target managers, and if so received, that informa-
tion must be disclosed to the target shareholders.23 1 The inside infor-
mation concerning the updated estimates of 'a' and 'b' will also have
to be disclosed if target managers make any representation concerning
the adequacy of the tender offer.
A troublesome situation arising after the 1989 Management's
Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Opera-
tions (MD&A) releasesM2 is the difference between the tests of Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson 23 3 and Item 303 of Regulation S-K23z 4 If the MD&A
test for mandatory disclosure were applied to preliminary merger ne-
gotiations, the MD&A requirements would force disclosure in some
cases that the Basic test would not. Under Item 303, forward-looking
data is to be disclosed if (1) management cannot determine that the
event is unlikely to occur and (2) it is otherwise of a material
amount2 35 The Item 303 test effectively requires the probability of
occurrence to be treated as if it were either 100% or zero percent.
228. Id. § 240.14d-9.
229. Id. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-2.
230. SEC v. Texas Int'l Co., 498 F. Supp. 1231, 1253 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
231. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
232. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Op-
erations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Release Nos. 33-6835, 34-26831, 54
Fed. Reg. 22,427 (May 24, 1989) [hereinafter MD&A Releases].
233. 485 U.S. at 249-50.
234. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303; RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AtL, FEDERAL SEcuRrriEs LAws:
SELEcrED STATUTEs, RULES AND FoRMs 232-35 (1994).
235. JENNINGS ET AL., supra note 234, at 233; see MD&A Releases, supra note 232, at
22,429.
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In contrast, the Basic test allows for a continuous spectrum from
zero to 100%. m6 Whether information could be withheld under the
business purpose exemption in rule 10b-5 cases is an unanswered
question.3 7 Disclosure under Item 303 may be more extensive than
under the antifraud provisions,1 8 although the MD&A interpretive
releases do provide that information need not be disclosed if it would
jeopardize the negotiations33 9
If the slack-poor corporation's managers distort or lie about the
updated estimates of 'a' and 'b' in the negotiations, such action could
constitute a misstatement of a material fact which might subject the
managers of the target, slack-poor corporation to liability for violation
of section 10(b), rule 10b-5, and sections 14(d) and (e). This potential
liability provides an incentive for managers of the corporation to tell
the truth about its value.
A hostile board of directors of the target corporation may engage
in defensive maneuvers and frustrate the takeover attempt by stop-
ping it or making it too expensive. A wide array of defensive maneu-
vers are available to thwart the takeover. These include a friendly
merger with a more desirable corporation-or white knight, a
counteroffer to buy by a friendly party, or a repurchase by the target
corporation of its own stock. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co.,24
Revlon,241 and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.24 im-
pose restrictions on the target corporation's board of directors' use of
defensive measures. The modified or enhanced business judgment
rule2 43 is in effect in takeover situations. The purpose of the enhanced
236. Basic, 485 U.S. at 250.
237. See, e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 849.
238. See Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F2d 22, 25 (1st Cir. 1987) ("The securities
laws do not operate under the assumption that material information need not be disclosed
if management has reason to suppress it.").
239. MD&A Releases, supra note 232, at 22,435 & nnA9-50.
240. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
241. 506 A.2d at 173.
242. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
243. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), Delaware
adopted a more stringent business judgment rule for takeover situations because of an
"omnipresent specter" that the directors may be acting in their own best interests rather
than the best interests of the corporation and shareholders. Id 'at 954. The court imposed
an "enhanced" duty calling for an initial judicial determination before the business judg-
ment rule is applicable. Id In Delaware "directors [in a takeover situation] must show
that they had reasonable grounds [to believe there existed] a danger to corporate policy
and effectiveness because of another person's stock ownership." Id at 955. This enhanced
duty is shown by good faith and reasonable investigation, particularly if done by a majority
of independent outside directors. Id.
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rule is to ensure that defensive measures are motivated by a good
faith concern for the welfare of the corporation and its shareholders
rather than to perpetuate management. 2" Under Unocal the board of
directors must make a reasonable investigation before adopting a
takeover defensive measure. 45 In order to facilitate an informed, dis-
passionate decision, the board investigation must provide material in-
formation and expert advice to the directors on such matters as
inadequacy of consideration, nature and timing of the offer, legality,
impact on stakeholders other than shareholders, and the risk of non-
consummation.246 Even if the transaction were approved by a major-
ity of independent, outside directors, the board of directors still has
the burden of showing its entire or intrinsic fairness. 247 Further, the
defensive response must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed
by the hostile bid.'
The Delaware Supreme Court in Paramount overruled the chan-
cery court holdings in City Capital Associates v. Interco, Inc.249 and
Grand Metropolitan Public Co. v. Pillsbury Co.,250 which indicated
that a target corporation's board of directors could only oppose a hos-
tile bid if it were a coercive, two-tier bid or constituted an all-cash bid
at less than a fair price."' The Delaware court held that the board of
directors of a target corporation may refuse to consider an all-cash,
all-share offer made at an adequate price.z 2 This is the "just say no"
defense. This holding applies to the factual context of deciding be-
tween long-range and short-range plans. 3
The fair price defensive tactic is used to defend against two-tier,
front-end-loaded attacks to protect shareholders who may tender be-
cause they fear being squeezed out at a lower price. 54 To protect
shareholders the consideration paid must be cash or the same type of
consideration paid for the largest block of the stock acquired and must
equal the greatest of: (1) the highest price paid by the offeror for any
shares of the target acquired during the tender offer period; (2) an






249. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal'dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988).
250. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
251. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1152-53.
252. Id.
253. See Grand Metro., 558 A.2d at 1057-59.
254. See, e.g., City' Capital Assocs., 551 A.2d at 797.
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the then market price of the target corporation's stock as the highest
price paid by the tender offeror bears to the market price of the stock
innmediately preceding the commencement of the tender offer; or (3)
an amount equal to the earnings per share of the corporation for the
four, full, consecutive fiscal quarters immediately preceding the pro-
posed business combination multiplied by the then price-earnings ra-
tio of the offeror.255 This provision ensures equal treatment of all
shareholders during all stages of the tender offer.
An alternate defensive tactic with the same effect is the right of
redemption privilege. Minority shareholders are granted the right in
the articles of incorporation or bylaws to put their stock to the tender
offeror at specified redemption prices. 6 The target corporation
could adopt a right of redemption privilege that reflects the updated
estimates of 'a' and 'b.' Such a signal could overcome the asymmetric
information problem. Right of redemption privileges are not permit-
ted in all states.5 7
3. State regulation of takeovers
More than forty states have enacted laws regulating takeovers of
companies incorporated or doing business in their respective states. 1s
These statutes tend to-be more extensive than federal law, which is
perceived by the states as having shortcomings, and tend to favor the
incumbent management of the target corporation. Between 1968 and
1982, thirty-seven states adopted "first generation" takeover stat-
utes.259 These statutes required a bidder to disclose certain informa-
tion concerning the offer. 260 One of the more debilitating aspects of
these state statutes generally imposed a waiting period of ten to sixty
days from the announcement to the commencement of the tender of-
255. DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(2) (1993).
256. See Nivrum Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Janovich, Inc., 840 F. Supp. 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1993).
257. The Delaware Court of Chancery upheld a fair value rights plan in MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 505 A.2d 454 (Del.
1985). Contra Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S.D. Ohio), aff'd, 815
F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
258. John C. Coates IV, Note, State Takeover Statutes and Corporate Theory: The Revi-
val of an Old Debate, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 806, 849 (1989).
259. Mark A. Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to
MITE and Kidwell, 42 Omo ST. L. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).
260. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. Am. §§ 36-456 to -468 (West 1987); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, §§ 801-817 (West 1981),
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fer.261 This waiting period allowed hostile incumbent management of
the target corporation to marshall its forces to ward off the tender
offer and frustrate the takeover attempt. Most of these statutes em-
powered a state official to determine whether the disclosure was ade-
quate and the offer was "fair";2 62 the designated state official was
empowered to conduct hearings to make these determinations.
263
There have been inconsistent decisions in the federal courts as to
whether or not these more extensive state statutes infringe upon the
federal prerogative of regulating securities. 64 The United States
Supreme Court's first decision regarding state takeover statutes re-
sulted in six separate opinions in which a bare majority voted to over-
turn the Illinois statute on narrow Commerce Clause grounds. 65
Following the Supreme Court decision, state takeover statutes in Ken-
tucky,266 Maryland,2 67 Michigan,268 Minnesota,
269 Missouri,2 7 0
Oklahoma,27 and Virginia 7 2 were invalidated. The Massachusetts
statute was upheld.2 73 Five years after its decision in MITE, the
United States Supreme Court upheld Indiana's takeover statute by a
six-to-three vote.274
261. See, e.g., DEL. CODE AN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1980); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 803(1).
262. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 804(i)(B).
263. See id. § 804(2).
264. Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98;247 (E.D. La. Apr. 30, 1979); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79-C-200, slip op. at 1-2 (N.D.
I1. Feb. 9, 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982); Dart Indus. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Ind. 1978) (enjoining state
laws). Contra AMCA Int'l Corp. v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979); City In-
vesting Co. v. Simcox, 476 F. Supp. 112 (S.D. Ind. 1979), aff'd, 633 F.2d 56 (7th Cir. 1980);
UV Indus. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Me. 1979) (upholding state statutes).
265. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 643.
266. Esmark, Inc. v. Strode, 639 S.W.2d 768, 770 (Ky. 1982).
267. Bendix Corp. v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Md. 1982).
268. Martin-Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 568 (6th Cir. 1982).
269. APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216, 1225 (D. Minn.
1985).
270. National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 524 F. Supp. 906, 913 (W.D. Mo. 1981),
aff'd, 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982).
271. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Serv. Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCII) 1 95,049, at 99,064 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 21,1982), aff'd, 715 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir.
1983).
272. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 547 F. Supp. 791, 799 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff'd, 697 F.2d 576
(4th Cir. 1983).
273. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1040 (1st Cir. 1982).
274. CMS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987).
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As a result of these setbacks, states adopted "second generation"
takeover statutes.2 75 This second generation of takeover statutes uses
several different approaches. One of the more common forms is the
fair price takeover statute.276 Under a fair price takeover statute, cer-
tain business combinations must be approved by a super-majority-
usually eighty percent, unless a statutorily determined fair price is
paid.2 77 The fair price formulae are complicated and extensive.
Other states have adopted control share acquisition statutes that
require shareholder approval before the corporation may acquire a
specified percentage of stock.278 The acquiring corporation may vote
its control shares only to the extent approved by a majority of disin-
terested shareholders of that class of stock.279 Business combination
statutes are also common.280 These statutes prohibit, for a specified
period of time, business combinations with any person who acquires a
certain percentage of stock."s Cash-out statutes and shareholders'
rights plan validation statutes have also been enacted.' The cash-out
statutes require an offeror who acquires a specified percentage of
stock to buy out any shareholder who desires to tender at a price de-
termined by the statute?3 A shareholders' rights plan allows the tar-
get corporation to issue shareholders' rights or options to purchase a
class of securities on conditions fixed by the board of directors.2
A "third generation" of takeover statutes is beginning to appear.
Pennsylvania,' Indiana, 86 and New Jersey' have adopted far-
275. Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul Maltesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation
State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291,291 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, State Anti-
Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 467,468 n.4; Jo Watson
Hackl & Rosa Anna Testani, Comment, Second Generation State Takeover Statutes and
Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Study, 97 YALE LJ. 1193, 1196-97 (1988).
276. See Karpoff & Maltesta, supra note 275, at 294-96.
277. Hackl & Testani, supra note 275, at 1205.
278. See id. at 1204.
279. Karpoff & Maltesta, supra note 275, at 294; see Hackl & Testani, supra note 275, at
1204.
280. See Karpoff & Maltesta, supra note 275, at 295-96.
281. From the Hustings: The Role of States with Takeover Laws, MERGERS & ACQuIsI-
TIONS, Sept. 1993, at 56, 56 ("Delaware's freeze-out law, for example, suspends a merger
for three years unless the board approves the combination or the acquirer obtains at least
85% of the shares in its initial tender offer.").
282. See id.
283. Id. at 57.
284. Id.; Jonathan Shub, Comment, Shareholder Rights Plans-Do They Render Share-
holders Defenseless Against Their Own Management?, 12 DEL. J. CoaR. L. 1991 (1987).
285. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 71-85 (1994).
286. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3.1.05-11 (Bums Supp. 1994).
287. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 49:5.1-19 (West 1994).
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reaching statutes in reaction to the enhanced business judgment rule
applied by the Delaware court in -Unocal, and Revlon. Indiana rejects
the Unocal rule and establishes a presumption that the board's action
in taking defensive measures is "valid unless it can be demonstrated
that the determination was not made in good faith after reasonable
investigation." 8 This third generation of takeover statutes is broad-
ening the corporate constituency statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this Article the asymmetric information problems related to
both negotiated-friendly-and hostile mergers and direct and bear
hug tender offers were examined. Only in a direct tender offer, where
managers of the target corporation remain neutral and silent, does the
asymmetric information problem disappear.2 9 In the direct tender of-
fer, neither the offeror nor the target shareholders are in possession of
inside information. Both sides benefit if the offered price is within the
acceptable range between S + a and S + A + f3.21 In all other cases,
asymmetric information is problematic. Moreover, managers of the
target corporation have an incentive to lie about the updated esti-
mates of 'a' and 'b."-91
Federal securities antifraud provisions provide some incentive to
tell the truth.2 ' In a negotiated merger or bear hug tender offer, the
offeror may obtain inside information from the target corporation's
managers. If so, disclosure may be required. Making a misstatement
of a material fact or omitting a material fact may result in liability.
293
If the target corporation's managers mislead or fail to disclose mate-
rial information to their own shareholders, they become liable. De-
fensive tactics may also be a source of liability under federal securities
law.
2 94
Under federal securities law, cost of lying = (2p - 1)(V - V) +
pCP. It pays to lie if the probability of getting caught is less than
twenty percent. 95 Thus, if managers perceive the probability of get-
ting caught at less than twenty percent, they will lie about the true
value of the corporation. The value of the corporation becomes V =
288. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(g) (Bums 1989).
289. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
290. See supra p. 516.
291. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
292. See supra part III.B.1.
293. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 240-57 and accompanying text.
295. See supra p. 528.
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V - pCP, or V = S + a + b - pCP. The shareholders will have no
confidence in the information received from their managers or the of-
feror if they perceive that the probability that the offending manage-
ment will not be caught lying is greater than or equal to eighty
percent.
296
The asymmetric information problem also may be addressed
through use of the fair price provisions of state takeover statutes.
297
The articles of incorporation or bylaws may be amended to provide
that the target corporation's shareholders be able to put their stock to
the corporation at a price that represents the updated estimates of 'a'
and 'b.' The fair price provision signals the updated estimates.298
Managers in possession of inside information may disclose, re-
main silent, or deceive. Direct disclosure may not be possible; how-
ever, some signals of the true value of the corporation may be given
through mechanisms such as the fair price statutes. Remaining silent,
coupled with nonaction, leaves the corporation undervalued. Deceit,
however, can be profitable.
296. See supra pp. 527-28.
297. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
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